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Abstract  
COVID-19 has presented unprecedented challenges to schools, leaving principals to lead rapid 
organizational change with limited guidance or support. Drawing on interviews from a larger, 
national interview study of principals at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, we analyzed the 
experiences of 20 principals in four large, urban school districts—Boston, Denver, New York, 
and San Diego. We found that principals relied on both district guidance and preexisting school 
structures and conditions as they led through crisis. Although no principals were satisfied with 
district guidance, principals responded to guidance on a spectrum—from abiding, to challenging, 
to subverting guidance. Principals’ responses were associated with their perceptions of the 
internal capacities of their schools, as well as the district guidance. Our findings support an 
emergent typology of principals as middle managers during crisis, which sheds light on how 
principals act as middle managers and how districts can support their work.  
 
Substantive Keywords: Leadership, Organization Theory/Change, Principals, Decision Making  
Methodology Keywords: Qualitative Research  

















The COVID-19 pandemic has tested schools’ abilities to rapidly pivot their modes of 
teaching and learning in an unprecedented way—revealing how resilient our school systems are 
to crisis, and to organizational change more generally. Operating between the often-competing 
demands of district guidance and their schools’ growing needs, school leaders have been tasked 
with leading organizational change under historically challenging conditions. As middle 
managers, school leaders regularly depend both on their “subordinates” and their 
“superordinates” for their success (Spillane et al., 2002, p. 760). On the one hand, school leaders 
work in resource-constrained environments and are frequently tasked with competing demands, 
such as “maintaining stability while delivering change” and “operating through existing routines 
and processes while developing new ones” (McKenzie & Varney, 2018, p. 384). On the other 
hand, middle managers like school leaders are simultaneously proximate to the “frontline” and 
aware of the “big picture,” so they are uniquely positioned to identify problems within their 
schools (Huy, 2001, p. 73).  
School leaders lead change within their schools by leveraging preexisting school 
structures and conditions, such as relationships, shared decision-making, and professional 
community (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Fink & Resnick, 2001; Fullan, 2002). Less is known, 
however, about how school leaders’ reliance on these conditions varies as they lead through 
crisis and are pressed with rapidly shifting demands from both their districts and their school 
communities. During periods of crisis, school leadership looks fundamentally different; rather 
than being future-oriented, leaders must deal with surviving the present in order to minimize 
longer-term harm to individuals and their schools (Smith & Riley, 2012).  
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Drawing on interviews with 20 principals conducted at the onset of the pandemic in four 
large, urban districts—Boston Public Schools, Denver Public Schools, New York City 
Department of Education, San Diego Unified School District—we explore the role of district 
guidance and school conditions in shaping principals’ work. We build on organizational learning 
theory and scholarship on the role of school working conditions to examine how principals 
operate as middle managers during periods of organizational change. We find that district 
guidance at the onset of the pandemic varied in its timing, substance, and flexibility, and 
principals responded to guidance on a spectrum—from abiding to district mandates, to 
challenging district decisions to initiate change, to actively subverting guidance. These responses 
were shaped both by the nature of district supports and guidance principals received, as well as 
their schools’ preexisting structures and conditions. Importantly, the patterns we describe are not 
comprehensive nor causal; rather, they represent associations that speak to an emerging typology 
of ways in which school leaders can and do function as middle managers and the organizational 
resources they rely on to lead. Thus, we present these relationships as an emergent framework 
for how principals as middle managers conceptualize their work in relation to external guidance 
and their school communities.  
School leadership scholarship has widely examined the role of school leaders as middle 
managers and as leaders of organizational learning. We build on this literature by additionally 
considering how school leaders conceptualize of themselves as middle managers and how they 
operationalize their roles in times of change. Our emergent typology reveals how school leaders 
conceptualize their roles as middle managers in the context of their district support, offering a 
framework for studying and understanding the middle manager role in times of urgent 
organizational change. Understanding the work of school leaders during crisis is important 
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because leadership stability is especially critical for schools in weathering periods of uncertainty 
(Smith & Riley, 2012). Given the massive disruptions COVID-19 has already presented to 
schools (Kraft et al., 2020; Kuhfeld et al., 2020), understanding the district and school conditions 
necessary to support school leaders’ work may prove critical in retaining school leaders and 
positioning schools to learn and recover from the ongoing crisis.   
 
Theoretical Framework and Prior Research  
Our analysis draws on organizational learning (OL) theory and scholarship on the role of 
school working conditions in shaping OL. Together, these lenses offer a means of understanding 
how school leaders—operating in the nested and overlapping organizational contexts of their 
schools, networks, and districts—act as middle managers.  
 
School Leader’s Role in Organizational Learning 
Originating in management studies, OL theory posits that organizations like schools 
“learn” by integrating knowledge from their interactions and previous experiences into their 
policies and routines (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Levitt & March, 1988; Farrell et al., 2019). 
Although OL is parallel to individual learning, OL relies on the “systemic thinking” of the whole 
organization (Senge, 1990). Learning is triggered by a “stimulus” —oftentimes a dramatic 
experience, such as a crisis, that brings about a perceived need to seek a solution to some 
problem within the organization (Leithwood et al., 1998). Within schools, school leaders can be 
considered “chief learning officer[s],” as they play a key role in shaping the conditions for OL 
(Weiner et al., 2021, p. 2). Leaders can provide other members tangible supports and the freedom 
and resources to innovate (Amabile, 1997). 
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School leaders’ ability to orchestrate OL is shaped by their position within nested 
organizational contexts (Marsh et al., 2017). Thus, they are responsive to external policy and 
district leadership and also face demands internally from their own school sites, which “pull 
[them] in two directions” (Spillane et al., 2002, p. 734). Given school leaders’ role in serving as 
brokers between their schools and districts, one way of conceptualizing their work is as middle 
managers (Spillane, et al., 2002). As middle managers, school leaders determine which demands 
to attend to with any given decision: when they judge external guidance as illegitimate (Huy et 
al., 2014) or at odds with their self-interest (Guth & MacMillan, 1986), they can actively resist 
and even subvert organizational change efforts. In the context of schools, principals can “buffer 
teachers from less aligned initiatives, allowing them to focus on a few key priorities” 
(Yurkofsky, 2020, p. 457), and filter messages based on their own sense-making (Coburn, 2005; 
Reinhorn et al., 2017). Donaldson and Woulfin (2018) propose a useful typology for 
understanding principals’ agency in policy implementation—suggesting that principals can go 
from “tinkering” with policy to “going rogue.” In this way, school leaders’ roles may differ from 
more traditional middle management roles in business, in that they can exercise greater agency 
over their school sites, depending on their district contexts. To better understand how principals 
see themselves as middle managers—and which conditions enable them to exercise more or less 
autonomy over leadership of their individual school sites—it is also necessary to understand how 
principals’ responses to external guidance are associated with the organizational capacities of 
their schools. 
 
Preexisting School Structures and Conditions 
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A central mechanism by which school leaders facilitate OL is through shaping the 
organizational structures and conditions in schools (Burkhauser, 2017; Johnson et al., 2012; 
Leithwood et al., 2008). At the heart of their work, school leaders shape the climate for learning 
(e.g., level of trust and collaboration) within their schools (Bryk & Schneider, 2002). School 
leaders can foster a shared purpose for their schools (Myung et al., 2020), shape professional 
culture (Habbeger, 2008; Harris et al., 2013; Reinhorn et al., 2017), and reallocate resources 
(Enomoto & Conley, 2008). Additionally, they can establish structures which enable OL, such as 
collaboration structures which foster teacher autonomy (e.g., teacher teams, professional learning 
communities) (Bowen et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 2018; Weiner, 2016).  
Schools’ “internal capacity” for learning is shaped by preexisting school conditions and 
structures (Stoll, 1999). Organizational conditions can trump other environmental factors, such 
as the level of economic disadvantage within a school community, in shaping schools’ capacity 
(Kraft et al., 2015; Simon & Johnson, 2015; Weiner et al., 2021). In particular, Bryk and 
Schneider (2002) posit that relational trust—i.e., the strength of relational quality among school 
leaders, staff, and the broader school community—is the bedrock of organizational change. 
Relational trust provides the safety and reduces the vulnerability of members of the organization 
to take risks and innovate (Seashore Louis & Lee, 2016). Weiner et al. (2021) find that several 
key organizational conditions—namely, “the nature of accountability, the degree of principal 
autonomy, the professional culture, and the teacher decision-making infrastructure”—have 
shaped schools’ abilities to learn through the COVID-19 pandemic (p. 14). These findings build 
off a rich body of scholarship finding that organizational structures, such as collaborative 
decision-making, work alongside organizational conditions, such as trust, in shaping schools’ 




Together, OL theory and scholarship on school working conditions provide a lens to 
understand how school leaders are constrained or empowered by their roles as middle managers 
between their districts and schools. The focus of our study is on how principals perceived 
preexisting organizational structures and conditions to influence their work and their ability to 
guide OL in their schools. The four key structures and conditions we focus on—decision-
making, teacher human capital, teacher collaboration, and relationships—all emerged from our 
findings as being the key school features which shaped principals’ responses. Our findings 
represent principals’ own conceptions of their roles as middle managers and the resources that 
support their work in response to urgent demands for organizational change.  
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Framework  
 
Methods  
This article is based on qualitative data drawn from a larger study conducted between 
April to August 2020. The study examined principals’ experiences leading their schools through 
the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. In this study, we focus on the principals’ approaches to 
responding to and enacting district guidance and leveraging preexisting structures and conditions 
in their schools. We address the following research questions:  
1. What guidance did districts provide to principals in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic?   
 9 
2. How did principals describe the role of district guidance in their work? Which factors 
shaped principals’ responses to district guidance?  
3. How did principals describe their reliance on preexisting school structures and 
conditions in responding the COVID-19 pandemic?  
 
Sample & Data Collection  
Interviews. During the spring and summer of 2020, we were part of a cross-institution 
team of 18 education researchers which interviewed 115 principals across 19 states. Each 
researcher purposively recruited principals working in traditional public schools through their 
personal network and then employed a snowball method to recruit additional principals 
recommended by participants. The result was a large and heterogeneous sample of principals 
who varied in experience, personal background, and training—leading schools which varied by 
grade level, size, demographics, geography, and performance level.  
Interviews were conducted via phone or Zoom and lasted between 60-90 minutes. We 
assured participants confidentiality and used semi-structured protocols to guide our interviews 
and elicit comparable data within and across sites (Maxwell, 1996). Prior to conducting each 
interview, we asked principals to complete a brief survey about their background. We asked 
principals to describe their school’s transition to distance learning—to identify district policies 
and directives during this period and to describe the role of preexisting school structures and 
conditions during the transition. We also asked principals to explain how they interacted with 
district officials, the teachers’ union, their staff, and students and families. Interviews were 
recorded and transcribed.  
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For this paper, we created a sub-sample of interviews with 20 principals—those leading 
schools across four large, urban school districts across the United States: Boston Public Schools 
(BPS), Denver Public Schools (DPS), New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE), and 
San Diego Unified School District (SDUSD) (Table 1). (We assigned pseudonyms to each 
principal beginning with the same first letter as their district). Eighteen of the 20 principals 
served a majority of students of color living in low-income communities. (Table 2). It is 
important to note that, in NYC in particular, the threat of COVID-19 was already visceral at the 
time of our study. By March 16, 2020, the date that NYCDOE shut down, there were 714 
reported cases of COVID in NYC. When other districts shut down, their cities had a fraction of 
that case count (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of Sampled Districts 
 
Table 2. Principal and School Characteristics 
 
Document collection. In preparation for interviews, and as we analyzed transcripts, we 
reviewed school and district websites to better understand the schools and districts studied. We 
collected descriptive information about the schools and districts from NCES, including 
demographic information about students and the school, and analyzed relevant documents, 
including guidance memorandums issued by district officials, memorandums of understanding 
between the teachers and principals’ unions and the district, news articles, communiques to 
families, etc.  
Analysis. We summarized each participant’s interview responses using a common 
template based on our research questions for this paper. We developed and calibrated our use of 
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a set of thematic codes (Appendix A)—etic codes drawn from the literature and emic codes that 
emerged from our initial analysis—and coded transcripts using Dedoose. Then, we wrote 
district-level memos synthesizing findings from across the key codes at the district-level and 
looked across memos to identify the preexisting structures and conditions which principals 
reported relying on the most across the districts (collaboration, decision-making, teacher human 
capital, and relationships). We created data-analytic matrices in order to compare responses 
within and across schools and districts and to identify emerging themes (Miles & Huberman, 
1994) and to cross-check with data from relevant documents. We addressed risks to validity by 
returning often to the data to review coding decisions, check our emerging conclusions, and 
consider rival explanations or disconfirming data (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We then modeled 
our case analysis after Marsh et al. (2017)’s organizational study of teacher evaluation systems 
and considered: the nature of district guidance in each of the four districts, the preexisting 
organizational school conditions which principals leveraged in their responses, and the 




Interviews for this study were conducted in the spring of 2020, as the pandemic was 
rapidly unfolding across the United States—during a notoriously difficult time for school leaders 
and teachers. Consequently, our research team recruited a convenience sample of principals with 
whom we had existing connections; however, principals who have relationships with education 
researchers may be more likely to lead especially strong schools. Additionally, the percentage of 
principals interviewed in a single district differed widely. Thus, it is important to note that the 
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sample is not, nor intends to be, representative of schools in the district. Although our 
recommendations cannot be transferred directly to other settings, our findings deepen the 
discussion of the role of principals as middle managers and provide considerations for district 
and school leaders about how they can establish the conditions that support middle managers in 





We organize our findings into three sections. Drawing on public reports and principals’ 
direct accounts, we identify that the three key sources of variation in guidance across the four 
districts in our study—the amount and timing of guidance, the substance of guidance, and the 
flexibility of guidance—accounted for distinct policy environments for principals’ work. We 
then classify each principal by how they described responding to district guidance—as Abiders, 
Challengers, or Subverters—and analyze the organizational structures and conditions associated 
with principals’ responses. We find that no principals felt adequately supported by the guidance 
they received. All principals relied on teacher collaboration, but principals’ reliance on decision-
making structures, human capital, and relationships varied, based on how they described 
responding to guidance.  
 
Variation in District Guidance 
 The principals in our study were operating within four distinct district contexts, and each 
adopted a different approach to providing guidance at the onset of the pandemic. Across the 
 13 
districts, there was variation in the amount/timing, substance, and flexibility of guidance. 
Notably, we observe that all districts were pressured to make rapid decisions without providing 
much advance notice to principals or teachers. Although all four districts engaged in collective 
bargaining with their teachers’ unions to establish work rules for their teachers, the nature of 
these agreements varied across districts.  
 San Diego. On Friday, March 13, 2020, SDUSD Superintendent Marten announced the 
cancellation of in-person instruction effective the following week (Sevilla, 2020). Marten said 
that the district would continue offering school food to students and students could access 
enrichment activities on the district website in lieu of formal instruction for the first few weeks 
(Washburn & Hong, 2020). At the end of this period, the district initiated a “soft launch” of 
distance learning in which the district focused on distributing technology to students, students 
completed work for credit but no grade, and teachers were offered professional development on 
remote instruction (SDUSD, 2020). Most of the formal guidance to schools came from a series 
of MOUs between the district and the teachers’ union. For example, an April MOU called for 
students to be “held harmless” with their grades, and noted that teachers could not be expected to 
provide more than 240 minutes of direct instruction and flex time (SDUSD & SDEA, 2020). As 
per the MOUs, principals were restricted from observing virtual classrooms without permission 
from teachers, and were not allowed to consult with teachers over the summer in order to plan 
for the Fall 2020 semester.  
Boston. On Friday, March 13, 2020, Mayor Walsh of Boston and BPS Superintendent 
Cassellius announced that the district would transition to remote instruction by March 17, 2020 
(BPS, 2020). Families were provided guidance on picking up instructional materials from 
schools, access to internet and technology, and school food (Cassellius, 2020). The district did 
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not issue formal guidance related to instruction, teacher work hours, or state assessments, 
however, until mid-April when state assessments were cancelled and the Boston Teachers Union 
(BTU) and BPS signed an MOU (Linksi, 2020; Vaznis, 2020). The MOU prescribed specific 
regulations regarding teachers’ work—limiting instructional hours, and requiring teachers and 
other staff to work at least 20 hours of week and attend at least 5 hours of professional 
development focused on virtual instruction (BPS & BTU, 2020).  
New York City. On Sunday, March 15, 2020, Mayor de Blasio announced that in-person 
instruction would be cancelled beginning the following day (Shapiro, 2020)—effectively asking 
school leaders and staff in the largest school district in the US to begin to transition their modes 
of instruction immediately. School staff were instructed to return to campus for the duration of 
the following week for training on remote instruction before remote instruction began on March 
23, 2020. The mayoral-appointed schools Chancellor Carranza announced that students would be 
invited later in the week back to campus to pick up learning materials (NYCDOE, 2020a), and 
later provided additional guidance on what virtual learning would entail, noting that each school 
would use its own online platform (NYCDOE, 2020b).  
The district did not issue further guidance on how to make the transition to remote 
instruction. However, in our sample, 7 principals were supervised through a common 
superintendency, the Affinity network. Composed of 164 schools across the district, the Affinity 
network is supported by nonprofit and university partners, including New Visions for Public 
Schools, Outward Bound, Urban Assembly, and CUNY, and serves as a source of professional 
community, as well as logistical support for principals. Whereas the rest of the district is 
governed by geographically-based superintendents, Affinity schools retain a separate set of 
centralized superintendents and are associated based on their shared substantive interests, rather 
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than geography. Support networks like Affinity were first introduced to NYCDOE in 2006 by 
Bloomberg as a district-wide strategy for supporting principals; however, all of the networks 
other than Affinity were dissolved in a restructuring plan in 2015 (Wall, 2015). As such, 
principals who belonged to the Affinity network were able to access unique resources and 
informal advice from other school and network leaders in a way that non-Affinity principals 
were not.  
Denver. On Wednesday, March 18, 2020, DPS announced that the district would 
transition to remote instruction after an extended spring break, following an executive order from 
the governor suspending in-person instruction (Hernandez, 2020). The Colorado Department of 
Education also announced that the state test for the year was cancelled, and the district provided 
guidance to families regarding the distribution of school food (DPS, 2020a). Shortly thereafter, 
the district published a Remote Learning Plan, which provided schools with the flexibility to 
choose from one of three options for instruction: (1) use district-provided digital instructional 
materials with teacher support, (2) teacher-led hybrid instruction, or (3) full teacher-led digital 
instruction (DPS, 2020b). Schools had the flexibility to decide which option would best meet the 
needs of their schools, but the district suggested that schools with lower levels of teacher 
proficiency with technology chose the first option, schools with some teacher proficiency using 
technology choose the second option, and schools with 1:1 devices and high teacher proficiency 
using technology choose the third option (DPS, 2020b).  
 
Principal Perceptions of District Guidance  
Despite the variation in guidance across districts, no principal we interviewed felt 
adequately supported by the guidance they received. Notably, the MOUs signed between 
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SDUSD and BPS with their respective teachers’ unions in response to COVID-19 were 
expansive—covering a wide range of topics concerning teachers’ workloads (e.g., work hours, 
grading, support staff, SPED staff, substitutes) as well as teachers’ nonteaching duties (Hemphill 
& Marianno, 2021). For SDUSD, the inflexible nature of the MOU constrained principals’ 
work—preventing them from consulting within their staff over the summer of 2020 to plan for 
the fall. Boston principals similarly shared that the delayed timing of this guidance constrained 
their ability to respond, as they were left waiting for key decisions at the state- and district-levels 
to pan out. As Principal Beale shared, “By Friday the 13th, I was honestly upset that I was in 
school, and I had trouble getting answers from central office.” When guidance was finally 
announced, Boston principals saw it as highly inflexible, particularly given that they had already 
settled on alternative ways of operating at their schools by that time. Although Denver principals 
appreciated the flexibility in guidance, the lack of consistency across schools created some issues 
in their work, as families became concerned by how their school’s approach compared to that of 
others in the district. On this point, Principal Day reflected: “It really felt that schools were 
pinned against each other a bit and not set up for success, and so that was hard.” Finally, the 
principals in New York saw the lack of guidance they received as unsupportive, rather than 
flexible. As Principal Noble reflected, the extent of district guidance was: “Get ready for remote 
learning.” Given the size and organization of NYCDOE, principals were often unable to clarify 
the vagueness of guidance when they reached out to representatives from the district.  
 
Organizational Structures and Conditions Related to Principal Responses to District Guidance 
 In response to their perception of inadequate, and even constraining, district guidance, 
principals needed to decide how to respond in ways that would be most productive to their 
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schools. Within and across the four districts we studied, principals varied in their reliance on 
preexisting school structures and conditions. To make sense of this variation, we classify 
principals’ responses to district guidance on a continuum—from abiding to district mandates, to 
challenging the district decisions, to turning inwards to their schools to subvert guidance (Figure 
2). No principal’s response was consistent across all areas of their decision-making; rather, we 
characterize principals based on how they described responding to the majority of district 
guidance. To do so, we pulled all excerpts in which principals discussed district guidance. For 
each area of district guidance (e.g., instruction, teacher work hours, food distribution), we coded 
the excerpt based on principals’ response type. We then determined each principal’s primary 
response type by considering how they responded to the majority of areas of guidance. To place 
principals on the spectrum relative to one another, we put principals who described abiding to 
more guidance further left on the spectrum, and those who described subverting more guidance 
further right on the spectrum.  
 
Figure 2. Principals by District and Response Type 
 
Based on principals’ response types, we then describe how principals leveraged 
preexisting structures and conditions during their efforts to transition their school in response to 
the pandemic. We focus on four key preexisting structures and conditions that emerged in our 
analysis as salient across principals:  
• decision-making (established norms for decision-making) 
• teacher human capital (principals’ perceptions of the experience and skills of their 
teaching staff) 
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• teacher collaboration structures (preexisting organizational structures, such as 
grade-level and department teams) 
• relationships (preexisting relationships that principals reported having an 
influence on their efforts) 
We observed key patterns within principal response types as well as themes that cut across all 
response types. Table 3 provides an overview of the patterns we observed.  
 
Table 3. Organizational Structures and Conditions by Principal Response Type 
Abiders: Strictly adhering to district guidance. The largest proportion of principals—
half of the principals in our sample (including 2 Denver principals, all 5 San Diego principals, 1 
Boston principal, and 2 New York principals)—were Abiders. These principals described 
waiting for district guidance before acting—even when they disagreed with the guidance. 
Abiders fell into one of two categories: (1) they felt that they had sufficient autonomy to carry 
out their work within the district, or (2) they were forced into compliance with the district by the 
collectively bargained agreement with the union. In both cases, Abiders worked within the 
existing system to enact and respond to guidance. In order to meet the demands of abiding to 
district guidance, there was wide variation across Abiders in their reliance on preexisting school 
structures and conditions.  
Finding pockets of support within the district. The principals who most strongly abided 
were those who found support within the district (2 Denver principals, 1 Boston principal, and 2 
New York principals). Typically, Abiders “waite[d] on [the] system to tell them what to do” 
before making key decisions. Abiders largely credited this to the pockets of support within their 
districts to flexibly adapt guidance to fit their local needs. For example, Principal Newhart—a 
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New York principal with 10 years of experience at his school site—shared that he had an 
“amazing superintendent” who created structures of support for principals. Although Principal 
Newhart saw the central district office’s guidance as largely logistical in nature, his 
superintendent supplemented that guidance with supportive instructions on how to lead through 
crisis:  
There was the adaptive guidance of like, “how to lead through a moment like this?” that 
was coming from my superintendent. [He] basically reads all day and night, and so he 
was just finding resources for us, […] for leaders in uncertain times—readers or 
resources for incidents, you know, post 9/11, post-Katrina.  
 
As such, some Abiders were able to find sufficient supports from within their districts, such that 
they did not express the need to challenge guidance.  
Pressure to abide to inflexible district guidance. The others Abiders (all 5 San Diego 
principals) expressed that, as one said, their “hands were tied” by their districts collective 
bargaining agreement—not because they had sufficient supports within the existing system. As 
high school Principal Stewart said: “I was leading under the construct of the MOU between the 
district and teachers’ union. And so, we were […] kind of limited.” Because the agreement 
prevented principals from making any demands on teachers’ time during the summer months of 
2020, San Diego principals expressed being constrained in their ability to plan for the next 
academic year. For these Abiders, it was not strong district supports that influenced their 
responses; rather, they lacked channels to challenge or subvert guidance without facing legal 
repercussions.  
Reliance on preexisting structures & conditions. Abiders’ responses were primarily 
dictated by the relationship between their schools and their districts and the intra-organizational 
routines that shaped those relationships, rather than their schools’ internal capacities. As such, 
Abiders had the most varied reliance on preexisting structures and conditions across the three 
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groups of principals: there were no clear patterns among Abiders except variation itself. 
Regarding decision-making, there were instances of stakeholder input, delegation, sole decision-
making, and collaborative decision-making. Abiders were also unique in that two put in place 
new processes, rather than relying solely on preexisting structures, for making decisions: one 
principal established a remote leadership team to carry out decision-making throughout the 
crisis, while the other became the sole decision-maker on many decisions out of necessity to 
make many quick decisions. Abiders also characterized variation in teacher human capital in 
their schools. For instance, several Abiders noted a range of experience among their staff with 
technology use, including many strong committed teachers, as well as teachers who were less 
engaged or who needed to “step up.” Further, some Abiders experienced challenges with 
relationships at their schools. Principal Stewart explained that some teachers were “very 
compassionate” and others weren't, which had implications on English learners and special 
education students’ access to supports. This variation suggests that Abiders’ responses were 
primarily shaped by their adherence to district guidance.  
Challengers: Networked Delegators. Six of the 20 principals in our sample (5 New 
York principals and 1 Denver principal)—were Challengers. All challengers discussed 
leveraging their connections to resources and decision-making bodies outside of their schools. 
The ways in which Challengers described themselves did not stop as leaders of their schools; 
rather, they also described themselves as mediators or middle managers between their districts 
and their school sites. Challengers were highly critical of district guidance but proactive in 
working beyond their individual schools to improve district guidance and supports. As Principal 
Davis shared, “Instead of complaining wondering what's going to happen, we need to organize to 
see what we can make happen.” Challengers identified channels of support within their districts, 
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e.g., district representatives and/or networks, which buffered them from challenging guidance. 
They also felt that they had the internal school capacity to challenge guidance.  
Seeing value in changing the system. Challengers were highly critical of their district 
guidance, but saw value in working alongside the existing systems to ensure coherence across 
their districts. Notably, Challengers were able to work within the existing system because they 
had existing intra-organizational routines and structures with the district which enabled them to 
share their voice in decision-making beyond their school site. Principal Davis, a veteran Denver 
principal who had led a school in the New Orleans post-Katrina, articulated the need to challenge 
from within the system in order to streamline decision-making and ensure coherence during 
moments of crisis:  
What I learned in Katrina [is that the] thing that happens is you got 15 people trying to 
make decisions and that just didn't work. […] We need to organize to see what we can 
make happen with that resources. […] our internal systems, and then we reached out to 
make sure those systems were consistent with the district and the government policies. 
 
Challengers saw value of aligning their school operations with district guidance, even despite 
their dissatisfaction with that guidance. As Principal Davis reflected: “We’re trying to make this 
systematic, uniform, and consistent message in a time of organized chaos.”  
 District networks as a platform and buffer to challenge the system. In other cases, 
principals’ key source of support and platform for challenging the system was through their 
district networks, such as the Affinity network in New York. For these principals, their networks 
ended up being more important than central office leadership. Principals saw these networks as 
distinct from the central district offices, in part because the networks had some autonomy to 
deviate from central district guidance. Principal Nott, a New York principal who quit her role at 
the end of the 19-20 academic year due to the lack of district supports throughout the pandemic, 
reflected: “I think that [the district] induced a lot of trauma on school leaders. […] I would say 
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our network was great. I think our superintendent is very supportive, but I think that his hands 
were tied.” Similarly, Principal Nelson, a high school principal in New York, shared that “the 
central [district] was in over their head with a lot of stuff,” but “it helped to be a part of that 
community [i.e., the network] of other like-minded schools” to fill the gaps in district supports. 
When districts had access to a network, it was often their lifeline. As Principal Nott expanded, 
“Without [my] network, I don’t know what it would like be a principal in New York City.” 
Reliance on preexisting structures & conditions. Challengers emphasized their reliance 
on preexisting delegation or collaborative strategies for decision-making in their schools that 
facilitated buy-in. For those who delegated, they relied heavily on other administrators and 
teacher leaders to take the lead on various decisions. As one principal summarized, “sometimes 
you have to lead, and sometimes you have to follow.” In other cases, Challengers’ decision-
making processes were highly collaborative, relying on input from across the school. Across 
cases, Challengers emphasized leveraging their delegation-based or collaborative decision-
making structures as a way to generate buy-in and “ownership” of their collective decisions. 
Challengers did not discuss their teacher human capital as a key component to their transition. 
Importantly, we do not suggest that teacher human capital was not important to these principals; 
rather, when discussing the key organizational structures and conditions that influenced their 
efforts to respond to the crisis, Challengers focused primarily on their delegation strategies, 
engagement with their networks, and strong relationships in their schools. In doing so, these 
principals revealed that they relied on strong collaborative relationships and delegation of 
leadership responsibilities in their schools while they reached outward to gather support from 
their networks and to influence decisions outside their schools.  
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Subverters: Self-sustaining islands. The remaining principals in our sample—4 of the 
20 principals (3 New York principals and 1 Boston principal)—were Subverters. Subverters 
were the most critical of district guidance, but reported that they lacked effective channels to 
voice their concerns to their districts. In the absence of these channels for challenging guidance, 
these principals took the risk of both pre-empting and actively ignoring district guidance because 
they trusted that they had the capacity as a school to respond. Subverters responded first by 
identifying the inadequacies of district guidance, and then turning inwards to focus on leading 
change within their own schools, rather than seeking to enact change in the system at large.  
Strong opposition to district guidance. Subverters were highly critical of district 
guidance. Principal Nasir, a New York principal with previous experience in health care, 
described on the shortcomings of the guidance she received:  
The directives I was getting from the DOE about how to handle situations were 
completely inadequate. And I was like, "Wait a minute, if this is supposed to be how you 
are going to contain an epidemic, this is inappropriate and impossible." They even told 
me to assign a person to sit with a kid who might potentially be infectious. And I was 
like, "This is ridiculous." And I refused to do it. 
 
Some Subverters responding by attempting to voice their concerns to the district; however, they 
saw preexisting intra-organizational district-school routines as solely performative. Principal 
Nash, the founding principal at her high school in NYC, poignantly shared her experience trying 
to engage with the district at a meeting for principals:  
[The district has] these [Zoom] meetings where everyone's on and there's a chat. 
Everyone is muted. No one can take themselves off mute. There's a chat that you can type 
into, but you can't see what anyone else is saying. You can type in questions, but no one 
ever responds to your questions.  
 
When principals identified that the structures to influence decision-making beyond their schools 
were futile, they often stopped attempting to engage in change at that level.  
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Turning inwards. Because they saw district guidance as inadequate, Subverters turned 
inwards to their schools and leaned on other school staff to make decisions that they felt best met 
the needs of their school. Principal Norman in New York synthesized this approach as: “Stay out 
of my way. Let me do what I need to do and let me get the job done.” Subverters were 
experienced (with nearly 10 years of experience at their schools on average) and had the 
foresight to anticipate the needs of their community. On this point, Principal Norman, a seasoned 
leader with 15 years of experience leading his school, reflected: 
I knew on March 1 that March 13th was gonna be the last day of school. I was really 
clear about that, so I was ignoring everything that the politicians were saying and I was 
getting busy getting my community.  
 
When Subverters felt that district guidance would prevent them from meeting the needs of their 
school community, they did not hesitate to pursue any means necessary to support their 
community. In order to “get the job done,” Subverters guided their school staff to similarly 
ignore guidance. For example, when Principal Beale in Boston felt that asking her teachers to 
prepare students for the state test (the “MCAS”) was the wrong priority, but the district has not 
yet provided guidance on whether or not the test would be administered, she did not hesitate in 
telling her staff to ignore the test:  
When I said I was distributing Chromebooks, [my teachers] all looked at me and said, 
“What about MCAS?” […] “I said, “F*** the MCAS.” And I don't normally talk like that 
to people, and they actually all cheered. I was like, “I don't even care. I don't care about 
MCAS anymore. I care about people being safe and kids learning.”  
 
Subverters responded to inflexible and, in the case of Boston, delayed district guidance by both 
actively pre-empting and disregarding the guidance they received.  
Reliance on preexisting structures & conditions. Subverters emphasized that they were 
able to subvert guidance due to their reliance on stakeholder input or collaborative structures for 
decision-making, strong school-family relations, and a school staff whom they viewed as highly 
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competent. Related to decision-making, Subverters relied heavily on internal structures for 
soliciting input from educators. One principal summarized:  
You cannot do things alone. The teamwork really matters, and I'm lucky enough to be [at 
a] big enough school that I have a leadership team, and that without their support or their 
willingness to do whatever it takes with me, I personally probably would have quit. 
 
The reliance on teachers for decision-making aligned with Subverters’ perceptions of their 
teacher human capital. Subverters consistently emphasized the high levels of teacher human 
capital in their schools, often referring to their teachers as “savvy” and “dedicated.” Confidence 
in their school staff’s capacity was a key preexisting condition that these principals described as 
important for shifting their norms and routines in response to COVID-19. In addition to relying 
on strong capacity within their schools, Subverters leveraged strong school-family relations to 
move through the crisis. Prioritization of school-family relationships fostered a sense of trust that 
may have been especially necessary during this time of transition. As Principal Nash in New 
York explained:  
We do things like that a lot where we say like, “This is what DOE says, and this is what I 
think. This is what I'd doing with my kids.” There's a high level of trust even though our 
families have a lot of reasons not to trust systems like the DOE.  
 
Nash believed that her teachers had the space to experiment and had been supported in high-
quality professional learning opportunities for years leading up to the pandemic, which 
facilitated the transition in response to COVID-19. These preexisting structures and conditions 
ultimately supported Subverters’ ability to turn inwards. Principals perceived their staff to be 
highly skilled and were bolstered by the support and input from their students’ families.  
Crosscutting themes: Teacher collaboration and strong relationships. While 
principals varied by response type, two key themes cut across all principals. First, across the 
board, principals heavily relied on preexisting team collaborative structures during the transition 
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to support shifts in instruction and ongoing instructional planning. As Principal Newcombe, an 
Abider in New York, described, teachers could fall back on to these structures “work through” 
the issues that COVID-19 presented:  
What happens a lot of times too, when there's a crisis is you're like, “Okay, throw it all 
out the window. We have to start from scratch.” And when in reality, we had structures in 
place: the crew system, our professional learning is an instructional rounds model… so 
[teachers] knew how to [use] the structures and the protocols to sort of work through that.  
 
Teachers typically met in content area and/or grade level teams each week to plan for instruction, 
share “best practices,” discuss student needs, “make sure they were on the same page,” and 
support each other with tech use. Teacher teams served as a way in which teachers contributed to 
ongoing decision-making through the COVID-19 transition, as well as a way to support ongoing 
instructional efforts.  
Second, nearly all principals described the importance of high-quality relationships to 
their work—especially relationships among staff and between staff and students. This was true 
even among Abiders; despite describing some uneven relationships in their schools, these 
principals emphasized the vast importance of having strong relationships among staff as a key 
condition to rely on during times of crisis. Consistent with Bryk and Schneider (2002)’s notion 
of relational trust, principals reflected that relational quality and trust was a key condition for 
enabling effective use of organizational structures. As Principal Daniels, an Abider in Denver, 
explained:  
To be able to move through crisis and move through the unknown, you have to rely on 
the relationships that you have built with the team, and I'm so thankful that we had really 
built relationships we could rely on so that we were in this crisis, we were able to jump 
into the crisis as a team.  
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Likewise, Principal Nott, a Challenger in New York explained, “I can't underscore that enough 
that having a really stable school environment when you're in a moment of crisis is incredibly 
important.” As Principal Nash, a Subverter in New York, elaborated:  
There's a lot of staff cohesion. So, I think going into this situation, all of that meant that 
we were in the best possible position to figure out what we could do to help, and where 
the opportunities were, and create consensus among the staff about what the best way 
forward was. 
 
Principals explained that strong relationships made their schools a safe space for teachers to 
bring their concerns to the table to brainstorm and attributed strong relationships in schools with 
high teacher morale, empowerment, and persistence to work through the time of crisis. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
Consistent with prior research, our findings highlight the importance of both district 
guidance and school conditions in shaping principals’ work. Building off of Spillane et al. 
(2002)’s notion of school leaders as middle managers, we find that how principals conceptualize 
their work is shaped by the nature of district guidance, as well as their perceptions of their 
schools’ internal capacities. When guidance was highly inflexible and legally binding, as was the 
case in San Diego, principals did not see any option but to abide by district guidance. Guidance 
alone does not determine principals’ responses, however. Notably, we categorize principals’ 
response types statically (i.e., based on how they responded in the majority of cases of district 
guidance), but all principals we studied fell on different places on that continuum for different 
decisions, likely due to the relative autonomy, resources, etc. they had to leverage in each area of 
decision-making. This suggests that principals’ roles as middle managers may look different 
based on the demands they are responding to and principals’ relative autonomy and level of 
district support may vary by area of decision-making. We observed the greatest variation in 
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principals’ responses in New York, where there was equivalent variation in how supported 
principals reported feeling by their district. Whereas some principals believed they had channels 
to voice their concerns to the district, others did not, and instead relies solely on the preexisting 
conditions at their schools. When district guidance was both inflexible and delayed, as was the 
case in Boston, principals were forced to either wait for guidance to arrive, or to pre-empt it. 
Even where the guidance was most flexible in Denver, however, one principal still challenged 
the guidance—suggesting that the substance of guidance, as well as its flexibility, matters to 
principals. Principals have been tasked with delivering on rapid organizational change, with 
oftentimes vague guidance that was uncoupled from supports. As such, ensuring that district 
guidance is both flexible and supportive of principals’ work is critical.  
These findings also support well-established findings that schools’ organizational 
conditions matter (Bryk & Schneider, 2002; Johnson et al., 2012). We expand on this scholarship 
by exploring the ways in which principals frame their reliance on organizational conditions vis-
à-vis their enactment of district guidance. Although strong relationships and teacher 
collaboration mattered for all principals, certain conditions were associated with particular 
principal response types. For example, because Subverters depended on their school community 
to follow alongside of them in rejecting district guidance, they benefited from collaborative 
school structures and strong family-school relations to back up their leadership. On the other 
hand, Abiders’ responses were primarily dictated by their adherence to district mandates, and 
their preexisting conditions were more varied. In some cases, schools had the internal capacity to 
respond effectively; however, this was not always the case.  
Additionally, we find that district networks can serve as a key district-level structure that 
supports principals work. According to Challengers, it was not a function of central district 
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offices to provide the support and spaces for shared-decision making that their networks afforded 
them; their primary function was to create new rules. Networks served as a buffer to challenge 
guidance, within otherwise large and highly bureaucratic working environments. This supports 
earlier findings that district networks support schools’ capacities for improvement (Cohen et al., 
2014; Rowan et al., 2009). Our results are consistent with findings that such networks enable 
collaboration, knowledge and cost-sharing, and work with external partners (Smith & 
Wohlstetter, 2001), and are particularly influential when they create distributed structures for 
leadership and resource allocation amongst network members (Wohlstetter et al., 2003). We find 
that networks’ support is especially critical to principals when they are tasked with leading 
through periods of great organizational uncertainty.  
 Our emergent typology of principal responses to district guidance contributes to 
scholarship on school leadership by providing a conceptual lens to better understand the ways 
that principals conceptualize their roles as middle managers, and how district and school 
conditions shape those conceptions. This builds on existing conceptions of how principals exert 
agency when enacting policy (Donaldson & Woulfin, 2018). We extend this work by drawing 
attention to the role of school conditions in shaping how principals employ agency in response to 
district policy. Together, this offers a deeper understanding of principals both as agentic sense-
makers of district policies, as well as leaders of their own organizations. Several principals 
additionally reflected on how their personal identities shapes their leadership; however, we had 
insufficient data to make definitive claims about the role of leader orientation and decision-
making. Future studies might build on our work to investigate which conditions and personal 
factors provide some principals the confidence to deviate from district guidance and which 
factors force others to comply—e.g., what resources were at play, and how their personal 
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identities tie in. Understanding how these roles intersect in principals’ work is key to better 
conceptualizing the nature of school leadership and middle manager roles more broadly.  
 These findings suggest several implications for policy and practice. For one, these 
findings highlight the need for district leaders to consider principals’ roles as middle managers 
when creating guidance and policy. Designing guidance to be flexible enough for principals to 
adapt to their contexts, while coupling that guidance with supports, is critical. This flexibility 
represents a need for districts to see themselves as learning organizations, too (Honig, 2012; 
Rusch, 2005). At every level of the system, organizational routines and policies need to be 
flexible enough to leverage the expertise of those closest to the work. Given principals’ role as 
middle managers, districts should leverage principals’ expertise in district decision-making and 
consider the ways that principals need to be responsive to their school communities when 
enacting policy. However, given that all but one of the superintendents in the districts we studied 
have left their roles since the onset of the pandemic (Table 1), the lack of leadership continuity at 
the district-level may create an additional hurdle for districts to learn—in a parallel way to how 
principal turnover affects schools’ capacities to learn (Useem et al., 1997).  
Second, our findings highlight the importance of districts networks for principals—
particularly when they offer a space for role-alike networking and collaboration. Given the new 
terrain COVID-19 has forced principals to navigate, having formal forums to learn alongside 
one’s peers was a key support to principals. Given that principal turnover is driven by poor 
working conditions (Levin et al., 2020) and professional isolation (Stephenson & Bauer, 2010), 
developing such spaces to support principals is critical to retaining principals and ensuring 
organizational stability in schools.  
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The COVID-19 pandemic has put tremendous stress on school leadership and provided 
schools with an impetus for learning. The extent to which principals are able to effectively lead 
organizational change in this moment depends on the broader district and organizational 
conditions which shape their work. As such, building schools which are resilient enough to not 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Sampled Districts (2019-2020) 
 














Boston  Brenda 
Cassellius 
(2019- )  
51,433 20% Hispanic/Latino 





29.2% English learners 
29.5% Students 




Denver Susan Cordova 
(2018-2020) 







27.4% English learners 
18.2% Students 

















13.2% English learners  
72.8% Students 
Qualifying for FRPL 
March 
16, 2020  
714 
cases 
San Diego Cindy Marten 
(2013-2021) 
103,194  29% Hispanic/Latino 
7% Black 
16% Asian 
44% White  
4% Multiracial 
 
20.9% English learners 
19% Students 




Notes. (1) COVID-19 Index is based on the 7-day case average in the city each district is located within, reported on 
the date of school closures in each district respectively. (2) We employ the racial/ethnic categories for the student 
demographics directly as they are classified by NCES. (3) FRPL is free and/or reduced-price lunch. 
 39 
Table 2. Principal and School Characteristics 




















Denver Principal Day  5 5 White  PK-5 450 25% 10% 
Principal Davis  14 1 Black  6-12 1,000 30% 10% 
Principal Daniels  8 5 White  6-8 800 75% 70% 
San Diego Principal Stewart  3 2 Black  9-12 1,700 98% 80% 
Principal Sullivan  11 5 Hispanic/Latino  KG-5 400 98% 95% 
Principal Shaw  - 0 White  KG-5 600 98% 95% 
Principal Snyder  12 7 Black  KG-5 400 98% 70% 
Principal Salas  11 11 Black  KG-5 300 98% 90% 
Boston Principal Boyle   7 30 White  9-12 1,200 90% 55% 
Principal Beale   7 7 White  PK-8 1,000 75% 50% 
New York 
City 
Principal Nelson  - - White  6-12 700 85% 65% 
Principal Neal  4 4 White  9-12 400 75% 75% 
Principal Newton 





Principal Nash  7 7 White  9-12 550 99% 80% 
Principal Noble 
 14 14 Native Hawaiian/ 




Principal Nott  3 3 White  9-12 450 98% 70% 
Principal Nasir  10 10 Hispanic/Latino  9-12 350 90% 80% 
Principal 
Newcombe 
 3 3 White  
9-12 250 
97% 85% 
Principal Newhart   5 10 White  PK-12 900 97% 80% 
Principal Norman   15 15 White  PK-12 900 96% 80% 
Notes. (1) All principal names are pseudonyms. (2) All enrollment numbers and student demographics (including racial/ethnic demographics and FRPL%) are 
rounded in order to ensure anonymity of research participants and schools. Student demographics are also not disaggregated in order to ensure anonymity. (3) 
Dashes indicate missing data.  (3) FRPL is free and/or reduced-price lunch.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework  
 
Note: Given the nature of our data and focus of our study, we do not provide evidence for shifts in schools’ 
organizational outcomes; however, we include these outcomes in our conceptual framework as a hypothesis to 




















Appendix A. Coding Framework  
Codes Description 
SCHOOL BACKGROUND  
School Context  Includes both school descriptions of school (e.g., student or staff 
demographics, regional context, description of neighborhood, history 
of school) AND descriptions of school mission (what the school 
aspires to accomplish – if explicitly talking about mission do not 
double code with culture) 
Turnover/Staffing Why other people stay or leave; both causes and frequencies, 
personal plans to stay or leave (especially if COVID-related), also 
about satisfaction and dissatisfaction, might be stuck in job; including 
staffing shuffles (e.g., budget cuts -> moving staff around)  
PRINCIPAL BACKGROUND  
Personal Background Personal background (past work history, education; philosophical 
reasons for becoming a school leader (including ongoing personal 
motivations, understanding of the purpose of the work, and personal 
values—e.g., concern for equity, interest in management); reasons for 
selecting to work at their particular school 
Principal Well-being  Mentions of how principal maintained/didn’t maintain their personal 
well-being during crisis  
Admin Role Descriptions of how the principal spends their time, including 
explicit talk around what they were working on during different 
phases of their response and how their work might have shifted (e.g., 
“I used to do X, and now I do Y.”) Also code “leadership lessons” 
here.  
SCHOOL CONDITIONS  
Collaboration Descriptions of formal/ongoing structures for teachers / school staff 
to work together and build a sense professional 
community/collegiality – more than a one off; horizontal 
collaboration (peer-to-peer); includes collaboration within school 
networks  
Relationships  Descriptions of relationships between members of the school 
community, including relationships amongst leadership, staff, 
students, and families. Might include descriptions of the level of trust 
in community, school’s relationship with families, etc. 
 
Double code with “Network” and/or “Collaboration” if 
relationships are mentioned as existing through either informal or 
formal spaces, respectively. 
Resources  Discussion of material and human resources (money, buildings, 
positions, facilities, internet/computer hardware, medical 
infrastructure at the school) – code used for any issues around teacher 
and/or student resource access; any mention of budget cuts  
Double code with “Equity” if issues around equitable resource 




Descriptions of principals and/or instructional coaches providing 
direct, formal instructional support themselves to staff (e.g., 
descriptions of teacher observations) either one-on-one OR via 
traditional professional development sessions  
 
Double code with “Collaboration” in cases where formal structures, 
like PLCs, are mentioned; likely to be double-coded with 
“Curriculum & Instruction”  
Curriculum & 
Instruction 
Descriptions of instructional issues—how teaching/learning was 
structured before/during COVID; including teachers’ instructional 
planning  
 
Likely to be double-coded with “Instructional Supports/PD” if 
principal discusses PD related to shifting instructional practices for 
virtual learning 
Student  Mentions of students– including student learning, student 
health/wellbeing, broader issues students were dealing with (e.g., 
homelessness/housing insecurity, hunger, mental/physical health)  
 
May be double-coded with “Family Engagement” when respondent 
explicitly calls out family as well, but not necessarily.  
Family Engagement  School's relationship and communications with families in particular. 
 
Likely to be double-coded with relationships, communications, 
students. 
Staff Wellbeing  Mentions of staff health/wellbeing – include mentions of broader 
issues staff families were dealing with (e.g., physical/mental health, 
managing work/life balance)  
Principal Supports  Descriptions of principals RECIEVING direct, formal leadership 
supports.  
 
Do not code informal supports principals receive from their 
colleagues – e.g., if they receive support from other principals in 
their district, code as “Collaboration”  
Network Descriptions of sources of professional community/collegiality 
BEYOND school site, such as external support from community 
partners working alongside district – e.g., Comcast providing free 
internet to families, foundations donating laptops, partnerships with 
non-profits 
 
Double code with “Collaboration” in cases of formal/ongoing 
collaboration, such as in a school network with structured principal 
collab. Opportunities  
DISTRICT CONDITIONS  
District  Description of district communications/guidance 
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Union  Mentions of the role of union in school/district  
 
Bureaucracy  Mentions of having to “jump through hoops” / the sense that the 
system came in the way of principal’s work, as well as mentions of 
principals being able to “game the system” and ignore guidance  
 
Likely to be double-coded with “District” or “Union” – depending 
on where the principal identifies the source of the bureaucracy  
 
EXTERNAL CONDITIONS 
COVID  Any mentions of COVID itself—including the incidence of COVID 
within school community and timing of incidence relative to school 
closures  
 
Likely to be double coded with other topics – i.e., whichever topic 
they are discussing COVID in the context of  
Protests Mention of nationwide protests on the school response to COVID  
 
Likely to be double-coded with “Equity”, if principal reflects on how 
protests spurred a conversation around equity at their school) 
Economy Mentions of how pandemic has affected school community’s 
economic security – e.g., job loss, students needing to work, 
homelessness.  
 
Do not include budget cuts here – code that under Resources. Do not 
code descriptions of underlying inequities here (UNLESS the 
economy during COVID comes up) – otherwise just code that under 
School Context and Equity.  
Government  Descriptions communications/guidance and/or directives from the 
government telling the school what to do structurally and/or dictating 
a policy–- e.g., messages from the city mayor, governor, federal 
guidance; resolving potentially competing guidelines  
 
Likely to double-code with “COVID” and “Bureaucracy” – 




Prior systems school leaders were able to draw on. Can be at the 
school or district level. 
 
ALWAYS double-code with the system in question (e.g., 
communication, collaboration, accountability) 
Accountability  Related to external accountability (state accountability status and 
state testing, turnaround status) - what the state does and then what is 
done as a result AND school-level accountability (e.g., how 
principals informally held teachers accountable, student attendance 
policies/practices)  
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Decision-making Descriptions of decision-making.  
 
Likely to be double-coded with child codes under either school or 
district conditions, depending on who was involved in decision-
making 
Communication Descriptions of communication structures – e.g., districts’ means of 
communication to principals; principals’ communicating with 
others/families. Distinct from collaboration (i.e., talking in regular 
team meetings).  
 
Likely to be double-coded with child codes under either school or 
district conditions, depending on the level/source of communications  
Equity Discussions of equity-related dilemmas or solutions related to 
race/ethnicity, special education, English learners, etc. 
Gem Quote  Strong quote/vignette  
 
 
 
